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Abstract
There has been much recent interest in the e¤ects of pre and non-market skills on future labor
market outcomes. This paper examines one such e¤ect: the e¤ect on future wages of military
leadership experience among Vietnam generationAmerican men. We study rank, not just veteran
status. We argue that rank is a good measure of pre-market leadership skills because of the clear
military hierarchy and the primarily youth experience of Vietnam service. Two sources of selection
bias are accounted for: non-random military entry and eventual rank attained. We apply a modied
2-stage parametric sample selection method. The rank premia on future wages are estimated using
the parametric selection corrections and a propensity score matching with two indices. We nd
evidence of a leadership premium, but not a veteranspremium. It is the rank that matters. If one
joins the military believing that military service commands a future wage premium, he had better
become an NCO or an o¢ cer. JEL: J24, J10.
Corresponding author: Chun Seng Yip, Sch. of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University,
90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email: yipcs@smu.edu.sg. This research is funded by the SMU O¢ ce of
Research.
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I am certain that ...[universal military] training ... will not only make our youth better equipped
to serve their country, but better mentally, morally, and physically.
President Harry S Truman, 1947 Commencement Address, Princeton University.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been growing interest among economists in the relation between labor
market outcomes and various forms of non-schooling human capital. Specically we are interested
in intangible qualities not measurable by classroom learning attainment, cognitive tests, receipt of
a diploma/degree, or acquisition of specic job skills through training. Some examples are qualities
such as discipline, responsibility, leadership, and motivation  qualities that are hard to quantify
or observe, and for which data is often lacking. In the economics literature, these qualities are
sometimes referred to as non-cognitiveskills (e.g. Heckman (2000)).
Why might looking at such non-schooling qualities be a protable direction to explain labor
market success? We can think of three reasons. One reason is the emerging consensus that tra-
ditionalpredictors of labor market outcomes, such as own and parental schooling, labor market
experience, occupation and industry characteristics and so on, account for less than half of observed
wage variation. Much of the observed wage variation remains relegated to the realm of unob-
served heterogeneity(Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001) and Abowd et al. (1999), for example).
A second reason is that recent evidence from employer surveys nds employers caring more about
qualities such as attitudeand motivationthan about schooling attainment in hiring decisions.
(See, e.g. Green et al., (1998)). A third reason is evidence that some aspects of adolescent expe-
rience matter for future labor market success. Participation in high school sports and experience
in a high-school leadership position have been found to be related to higher future wages, while
deviant and delinquent behavior are correlated with lower future wages. (See Kuhn and Weinberger
(2005), Anderson (2000), Cawley et al. (2000), and Barron et al., (2000)).
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This paper seeks to understand the nature of the relationship between non-cognitive skills
and labor market success, using military rank as the measure of a quality such as leadership
and discipline. In particular, we use data on Vietnam-era youths (including veterans and non-
veterans) to study whether the highest attained military rank has further labor market impact in
subsequent civilian life.
Why Study Leadership, Military and Rank? We consider rank and veteran experience
particularly suitable measures of non-cognitive factors. Our motivation arises from the observation
that leadership qualities are highly valued in all sectors of work, public or private. While this
appears to be conventional wisdom, we have not encountered much work that relates leadership to
what we think of as human capital. The literature cited above represents the two related views that
(1) non-cognitive human capital and (2) pre-labor market factors such as late-adolescent experiences
are signicant determinants of subsequent labor market success. Military experience, we believe, lies
somewhere between these two views. The military provides training in discipline and motivation
that is more rigorous than high school leadership experience or atheletics. Furthermore, rank is an
easily observable measure that is likely to be highly correlated with actual leadership experience.
Higher rank implies greater responsibilities and leadership. Finally, military experience, at least in
the sample we consider, is largely constrained to late teenage, post-high school years. From this, we
argue that by considering the military experience of young men, we essentially consider the e¤ect
of pre-labor-market experience.
Empirical Approach We use data from the National Longitudinal Surveys1966 Young Men
Cohort (NLSYM). This data covers the experiences of the very cohorts known as the Vietnam gen-
erationand contains substantial information regarding individualsexperiences with the military
and the draft system during that time. A well known empirical challenge is that of non-random se-
lection into the military. To that, our research question adds the selection problem of the eventual
rank attained. These challenges arise from two sources: on the one hand, there is heterogeneity in
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military ability or interest, while on the other hand, it is well known that loopholes in the draft
system allowed some eligible males to avoid conscription (Baskir and Strauss (1978) and Foley
(2003) provide a good background to the draft system and avoidance behavior).
In addition to the economic contribution, we also make a methodological contribution. We
present ways to account for the above two sources of selectivity: (1) selection into the military; and
(2) selection on the eventual rank attained. We do so by developing and estimating a simultaneous
probit and ordered probit for military service and rank respectively. From this we derive para-
metric selection correction techniques and two-dimensional propensity-score matching techniques
to address the question of the rank premium.
Summary of Results Our ndings are twofold. One methodological, the other substantive.
We nd that parametric selection correction fails to display evidence of a premium on rank. We
nd also that the selection correction terms are jointly not signicant. This suggests that a least
squares regression of a Mincer type wage equation augmented to include rank dummies, may su¤er
from less selection bias than originally thought. Our matching method delivers more promising
results. In a variety of matching techniques, we nd that the rank wage premium is absent among
privates, but is positive and signicant among corporals and sergeants. Thus we take this as
evidence that veteran service per se, is not enough to generate a future wage premium; one needs
to have been a veteran and a leader. We consider this our main nding, supporting the view that
non-cognitive skills matter for the labor force.
Discussion of Related Work This paper draws together two strands of empirical work in
labor economics. The rst strand is that of the growing literature on non-cognitive skills that has
been discussed earlier. The other literature is that of the veteranswage premium, elaborated in
the next section. The early papers mostly used ordinary least squares approaches to ask whether
veteran status a¤ects future wages. Subsequent work applied various methods such as instrumental
variables and matching methods to account for the nonrandom selection. There have not been too
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many studies in this latter vein, and hence it has not been easy to draw rm conclusions.
The closest work to ours are Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) and Hirsch and Mehay (2003). Kuhn
and Weinberger present evidence that teenage leadership experience relates to future labor market
success. Hirsch and Mehay do matching to compare active duty servicemen with reserve component
servicemen. They nd a small veteranspremium of around 3 percent. However their matching
method is restricted to a limited set of covariates, namely age and race, and they do not control for
selection into eventual rank. Interestingly they report a larger veterans premium among o¢ cers
suggesting some evidence of greater returns to leadership and responsibility.
While our paper relates to the previous works, it is di¤erent in several ways. Firstly, whereas
veteran status is a binary state in previous work, rank is a measure of leadership. We argue, if there
is a wage premium among veterans, it is rank (and thus a non-cognitive skill such as leadership),
and not veteran status per se, that generates heterogeneity in military returns. Secondly, we ll
a gap in the literature by applying propensity score matching and thus making use of a higher
dimensioned set of covariates, including longitudinal information.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents the background and motivation.
Section 3 shows our parametric approach. Section 4 presents our two-dimensional propensity-score
matching approach. Section 5 discusses the data and provides the results. Section 6 discusses and
concludes.
2 Background and Motivation
Our motivation arises from the observation that leadership qualities are valued in civilian labor
markets. For example, a search of articles in the Harvard Business Review with the keyword
leadership yielded 316 hits. A search at the websites of the top ranked American Business
Schools show that leadership courses increasingly form part of the core curriculum. Interestingly
Kuhn and Weinberger (2005) cite examples of top business schools incorporating Marine boot
campsas part of the MBA education. This suggests belief that business leadership and military
5
leadership skills are correlated.
American society at large appears to value military service. A distinguished service record
opens lucrative civilian job o¤ers, while questionable service records can imply character aws that
can haunt the individual many years. It is revealing that individuals seeking political o¢ ce are
often scrutinized for their military experience. For instance, of the eleven American presidents
since WWII, eight performed wartime service. The two most recent Presidents Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush were frequently dogged by calls to account for their failure to serve in Vietnam.
Previous work has found that participation in high school athletics and leadership of clubs and
societies have a positive e¤ect on future wages (Kuhn and Weinberger (2005), Eide and Ronan
(2000), Barron et al. (2000) and Postlewaite and Silverman (2005)). It is argued that better
future labor market outcomes are related to the non-cognitive skills such as leadership, personal
motivation, discipline developed through these activities. Relatedly Heckman and Carneiro (2004)
report that early childhood intervention and teenage mentoring programs often uncover substantial
program impact on non-cognitive skills that are stronger than e¤ects on mesurable cognitives. Taken
together, we see a growing body of evidence pointing to the signicance of pre-market non-cognitive
skills in human capital.
Many studies on military service suggest the importance of military experience for future wages,
but few have approached it from the viewpoint of non-cognitive skills. Most work comes from
Americas Vietnam experience, while some are from WWII. The results appear mixed. The
earlier work applies OLS to wage regressions incorporating a dummy variable for veteran status
(For example De Tray (1982), Berger and Hirsch (1983) and Goldberg and Warner (1986).). On
average the results suggest a positive wage premium for World War II veterans, but somewhat
weaker evidence on Vietnam veterans. However as pointed out by Hirsch and Mehay (2003) the
problem of selection bias makes it hard to draw clear conclusions. The more recent studies, notably
by Angrist (1989, 1990), Angrist and Krueger (1994), Hirsch and Mehay (2003) that provide more
robust controls for military selection, nd generally small benets to veteran status and on occasion
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nds wage penalties. Angrist (1990) used the draft lottery number as an instrument for military
service. While he tries a variety of methods, his most notable contribution is to separate the
population into two groups: the at riskgroup consisting of those whose draft number falls below
the announced threshold, and those not at risk, i.e. with numbers above the threshold. Thus he
constructs a Waldestimator of the military e¤ect, with a binary instrumental variable. Hirsch
and Mehay (2003) adopt a di¤erent approach. They perform a matching estimation to estimate
the e¤ect of treatment on the treated (TT). However rather than using propensity score methods,
they deliberately keep matching to a limited set of covariates, namely by age and race. This, they
argue, is due to the fact that they use a data set consisting of reservists, and in that sample, age
is the major way in which veterans and nonveterans di¤er.
A dummy variable for veteran status seems inadequate to capture the military experience.
Many di¤erent military specializations and the echelons of leadership and responsibility suggest
that the military experience is far from homogeneous. Consider the case of rank. The experience
of a private is di¤erent than that of a commissioned o¢ cer or NCO. The private is primarily a
follower, whereas the NCO and o¢ cer are leaders responsible for increasing numbers of troops. A
corporal is often in charge of around 5 soldiers. A sergeant would normally lead upwards of 10
troops, a lieutenant would be a leader of 40 troops, and a captain would lead 150 to 200 troops.
Clearly it is harder to be a lieutenant than a private. Those promoted to the higher ranks would
normally have displayed the potential to assume greater responsibility. Being exposed to higher
levels of responsibility in turn a¤ords many opportunities to further develop non-cognitive skills of
the sort under investigation.
If our view is correct, then we should detect premia not simply to veteran status, but to
leadership experience (i.e. rank in our case). Considering that high school leadership has signicant
e¤ects on future wages, we should expect military leadership experience, which is more challenging,
to have at least as much e¤ect on future wages.
Our main challenge is that we face a non-standard sample selection problem for which a solution
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needs to be developed. It is that we must account for entry into the military, as well as the rank
attained. This is what we turn to in the next two sections. We present a parametric approach
and a non-parametric approach. The former is based upon parametric sample selection, with a
non-standard rst stage; we develop parametric selection correction terms for the second stage.
The nonparametric approach is propensity-score matching using the two indices estimated via the
rst stage.
3 Two-Stage Parametric Approach
We adopt a two-stage parametric approach. In the rst stage, selection is based upon two events.
The rst selection denotes military entry, and the second selection is an ordered discrete response
(ODR) representing rank nally attained. In the second stage, we estimate a log-wage equation of
the usual form.
Let di1 be a binary variable denoting military entry for individual i, and di2 is ordered response
denoting the rank such that f1; 2; 3; 4g corresponds to {private, corporal, sergeant, o¢ cer}. Dene
indicator function 1[A] = 1 if A holds and 0 otherwise. The empirical model is as follows:
First Selection : di1 = w
0
i1 + "i1; di1 = 1[d

i1 > 0];
Second Selection : di2 = w
0
i2 + "i2; di2 =
3X
r=1
1[di2  r]; 1 = 0; (1)
Log-wage : yi = x0i + ui; E("1) = E("2) = E(u) = 0
where the regressor w may include x and the second selection equation is ODR with unknown
thresholds 2 and 3. What is observed is
(di1; di1di2; w
0
i; yi)
0; i = 1; :::; N; iid;
di2 is observed only when di1 = 1. In view of the iid assumption, we will often omit the subscript
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i in the following. Dening "  ("1; "2)0, further assume
Normality of " : " follows N (0;
) ; 
 
2664 1 12
12 1
3775 ; independently of w;
Linear Projection uj" : E(ujw; ") = (1; 2)"; where (1; 2) = E(u"0)  fE(""0)g 1:
The joint estimation of the parameters with MLE is di¢ cult because we have to estimate three
correlation parameters, 12, 1u  COR("1; u), and 2u  COR("2; u); estimating covariance
matrix is often the source of non-convergence in numerical optimization. Also the MLE requires
the joint normality of ("1; "2; u) that is stronger than the combination of the normality of " and the
linear projection assumption. Instead, we can proceed in the following two stages. First, estimate
(01; 
0
2; 12; 2; 3) with the MLE for (d1; d1d2); denote the estimator as (a
0
1; a
0
2; r12; g2; g3). Second,
do a Heckman type least squares estimation of y on x and the selection correction terms that are
known functions of two indices w0a1 and w0a2.
For this procedure, we need to derive the likelihood function for the rst step and the selection
correction terms for the second step. The main complication here is the selection problem of the
ODR d2 observed only when d1 = 1. Although an analogous selection problem with a binary d2
appeared in Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) and Dubin and Rivers (1989), our type of the
selection problem has not appeared in the literature as far as we are aware of. As shown in the
following, the rst step is relatively straightforward, but the closed form formulas are di¢ cult to
obtain for some selection correction terms; for these, we will use numerically computed selection
correction terms.
3.1 Likelihood Function for the First Stage
Dene  ("1; "2; 12) as the standard joint normal density function with correlation 12, and
	("1; "2; 12) 
Z "2
 1
Z "1
 1
 (t1; t2; 12)dt1dt2:
The log-likelihood function to maximize for (1; 2; 12; 2; 3) consists of ve terms corresponding
to the ve cases: d1 = 0; (d1 = 1; d2 = 0), (d1 = 1; d2 = 1), (d1 = 1; d2 = 2), and (d1 = 1; d2 = 3).
9
The log-likelihood function is
NX
i=1
[ (1  di1)  ln( w0i1) (2)
+di11 [di2 = 0]  lnP ( w0i1 < "i1; "i2 <  w0i2)
+di11 [di2 = 1]  lnP ( w0i1 < "i1;  w0i2 < "i2 <  w0i2 + 2)
+di11 [di2 = 2]  lnP ( w0i1 < "i1;  w0i2 + 2 < "i2 <  w0i2 + 3)
+di11 [di2 = 3]  lnP ( w0i1 < "i1;  w0i2 + 3 < "i2) :
A detailed explanation of the derivation of this likelihood function is in the appendix.
3.2 Correction Term for the Second Stage
The selection correction term for the case d1 = 0 is easy to derive. As is well known, with
u  SD(u),
E(yjw; d1 = 0) = x0 + E(ujw; "1 <  w01) = x0   1uu
( w01)
( w01) : (3)
More di¢ cult to derive are the selection correction terms for the d1 = 1 cases. We use the linear
projection assumption of uj": The correction terms are presented here while the details are left to
the appendix. Dene the correction term in (3) as c(1; 2; 12; 2; 3), and jk(1; 2; 12; 2; 3),
j = 0; 1; 2; 3 (denoting rank), and k = 1; 2 (denoting rst or second correction) for d1 = 1 such that
non veterans : E(ujw; d1 = 0) =  1uu  c =  1uc where 1u  COV ("1; u);
privates : E(ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 0) = 101 + 202;
corporals : E(ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 1) = 111 + 212;
sergeants : E(ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 2) = 121 + 222;
o¢ cers : E(ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 3) = 131 + 232;
where for privates,
01 = E ("1jw; w01 < "1; "2 <  w02) =
R  w02
 1
R1
 w01 "1 ("1; "2; 12) d"1d"2R  w02
 1
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12) d"1d"2
; (4)
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02 = E ("2jw; w01 < "1; "2 <  w02) =
R  w02
 1
R1
 w01 "2 ("1; "2; 12) d"1d"2R  w02
 1
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12) d"1d"2
; (5)
for corporals,
11 = E ("1jw; w01 < "1; w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2) =
R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01 "1 ("1; "2; 12) d"1d"2R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12) d"1d"2;
;
(6)
12 = E ("2jw; w01 < "1; w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2) =
R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01 "2 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2
;
(7)
for sergeants,
21 = E ("1jw; w01 < "1; w02 + 2 < "2 <  w02 + 3) =
R  w02+3
 w02+2
R1
 w01 "1 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R  w02+3
 w02+2
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2
;
(8)
22 = E ("2jw; w01 < "1; w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2) =
R  w02+3
 w02+2
R1
 w01 "2 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R  w02+3
 w02+2
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2:
;
(9)
and for o¢ cers,
31 = E ("1jw; w01 < "1; w02 + 3 < "2) =
R1
 w02+3
R1
 w01 "1 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R1
 w02+3
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2
; (10)
32 = E ("2jw; w01 < "1; w02 + 3 < "2) =
R1
 w02+3
R1
 w01 "2 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R1
 w02+3
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2
: (11)
3.3 Second-Stage OLS Estimation
We next dene ve dummy variables c; 0; :::; 3 for the ve categories (e.g., c is for d1 = 0, 0 is
for (d1 = 1; d2 = 0),...), and its category number
  c + 20 + 31 + 42 + 53:
Dene ~mi and  such that
xi = (ci; 0i; 1i; 2i; 3i; ~m
0
i)
0 and  = (c; 0; 1; 2; 3; 
0
~m)
0;
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here ~m does not include the unity but it may include interaction terms between c; 0; :::; 3 and
some covariates. Rewrite the outcome equation as
y = cc + 00 + 11 + 22 + 33 + ~m
0 ~m
+
8<: cE (ujw; c = 1) +
3X
j=0
jE (ujw; j = 1)
9=;+
24 u  cE (ujw; c = 1)  3X
j=0
jE (ujw; j = 1)
35 :
The part in fg is the selection correctionterm, and the part in [] is the error term. The selection
correction term can be written as
 c1uc +
3X
j=0
j(1j1 + 2j2) =  1u  cc + 1
3X
j=0
jj1 + 2
3X
j=0
jj2:
Further dene
v  u  cE(ujw; c = 1) 
3X
j=0
jE(ujw; j = 1)
to rewrite the outcome equation as
y = cc + 00 + 11 + 22 + 33 + ~m
0 ~m   1ucc + 1
3X
j=0
jj1 + 2
3X
j=0
jj2 + v:
Observe that
E(vjw;  = j) = E(vjw; j = 1) = E(ujw; j = 1)  E(ujw; j = 1) = 0 for j = c; 0; 1; 2; 3;
which justies OLS estimation for the outcome equation. The identied parameters are
0;  1u; 1; 2:
For our empirical analysis, instead of the ve dummies c; 0; :::; 3, we will use only the last
four 0; :::; 3 along with the unity. In this case, substituting c = 1   0   1   2   3 into the
above outcome equation, we get
y = 0(0   c) + 1(1   c) + 2(2   c) + 3(3   c) +m0m (12)
 1ucc + 1
3X
j=0
jj1 + 2
3X
j=0
jj2 + v
where m  (1; ~m0)0 and m = (c; 0~m)0:
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Interaction terms between c and covariates in ~m are also removed by substituting c = 1 0 1 
2   3; i.e., m includes interaction terms between covariates and 0; :::; 3 only. The parameters
for 0; :::; 3 show the military rank premiumrelative to the basecivilian case.
4 Program Evaluation Approach
In this section, we describe our matching approach. Our outcome of interest is post-military civilian
wage. In the data we use wage in 1980 and 1981, and our parameter of interest is the e¤ect of
treatment on the treated (TT). We have four treatments (private, corporal, sergeant, and o¢ cer)
relative to no treatment (no military service).
The matching approach is based on a simple idea. For each subject in the four treated pools,
we nd a set of controls (untreated) closest in terms of the two indices that are the two linear
functions in the rst stage MLE. The matched controls are used as the comparison group to
construct the counter-factual no-treatment response of the treated. In the following, for the sake
of expostion, we will use a binary variable d = 0; 1 to denote treatment and no treatment. Since
we will be comparing each treatment (there are four) to no treatment, this simplication does no
harm.
Let y1 and y0 be two potential responses, treated and untreated, respectively. The TT e¤ect is
E (y1   y0jd = 1) = E (y1jd = 1)  E (y0jd = 1)
where the second term on the r.h.s. is a counter-factual to be constructed. If we have some
covariates x and if E (y0jd; x) = E (y0jx) ; then the following construction of the counterfactual is
valid:
E (y0jx; d = 0) = E (y0jx; d = 1) :
In other words, for a treated subject with xi; we nd a group of untreated controls with x = xi.
Since their covariates are similar, then presumably so is y0: It thus follows that
E (y1   y0jd = 1) =
Z
fE (yjx; d = 1)  E (yjx; d = 0)g f (xjd = 1) dx:
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When d takes values 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; we can think of E (y2   y0jd = 2) and so on.
An important issue is how to choose the control groups. If the dimension of x is large, it is
advantageous to replace x by its propensity score Pr (d = 1jx) as proposed by Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983). Since P (d = 1jx) in our data depends on two events of joining the military and to
attain a particular rank, there are two linear indices determining P (d = 1jx) :We thus use the two
indices obtained in section 3, instead of four propensity scores; the issue of how to do matching in
multiple treatment cases is discussed in some detail in Lee (2005). For a given treated case i; we
use the following metric, known as the Mahalanobis distanceto measure similarity of a control to
case i :
Di;m = (i   m)0 C 1N (i   m) (13)
where i = (w0ia1; w
0
ia2)
0
; m indexes the subject in the control group, CN is the sample covariance
matrix of : With Di;m we implement several di¤erent matching criteria, namely pairwise, M-
nearest neighbor (M-NN), and xed caliper matching. Let NT be the number of treated cases, Ni
be the number of successful matches to treated subject i; Ci be the set of controls for treated subject
i; and ymi be the wage of the m-th control that is matched to treated subject i: An estimator for
the e¤ect of treatment on the treated is
TTN =
1
NT
X
i2T
"
yi   1
Ni
X
m2Ci
ymi
#
(14)
where i 2 Tmeans that i is in the treatment group, and m 2 Cimeans that m is in the matched
controls for the treated subject i: In the case of pairwise matching, this is
TTN =
1
NT
X
i2T
(yi   ymi) : (15)
In the case of M-NN matching this is
TTN =
1
NT
X
i2T
"
yi   1
M
X
m2Ci
ymi
#
: (16)
In the case of xed caliper matching, Ci in equation (14) is the set fm 2 control group : Di;m  Kg
where K is the caliper. In caliper matching there will be some unmatched treated units if K is
small.
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To evaluate matching success, we check how balanced  is across the two groups at the
aggregate level, by calculating the following statistic for each linear index j = 0; 1 :
M(j) =
P
i2T
 
ij  N 1i
P
m2Ci mj
  1 [Ci 6= ]P
i2T 1 [Ci 6= ]
: (17)
For each index j we calculate the average distance between the treated subjects and their respective
matched controls. This number should be close to zero if the matching is successful.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Data
The NLSYM began in 1966 and ended in 1981. The rst ve waves and last two waves were collected
annually, and remaining waves were collected biannually. This data consists of 5225 young men aged
14 to 24 in 1966 and it is unique for its coverage of the very cohorts that faced the draft during
the Vietnam years - the young men known as the Vietnam generation. Compared to other
data sets, the NLSYM contains a substantial amount of information regarding military service and
experience with the draft system. Questions pertaining to military and draft experience were asked
in the 1966, 1969, 1971, 1976, and 1981 waves. They included questions on veteran status, the
branch of service, the rank he held, whether he had enlisted or been drafted, the duration of active
duty etc. Those who did not serve were asked questions pertaining to their draft eligibility. This
data forms a rich body of wartime information available in a longitudinal survey. Unfortunately,
one drawback is its high attrition rates. By the end of the survey in 1981, only 65 percent of
the 1966 respondents were contacted. Most of the remainder were refusals or dropped after two
consecutive non-interviews; 139, or 2.7 percent of the sample, were deceased - a high mortality rate
to be sure, but not signicant enough relative to attrition.
We start by presenting the summary statistics of the variables in table 1.
table 1 about here
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About 32% of the sample are veterans. An asterisk indicates that the di¤erence in means
between veterans and nonveterans is signicant at the 5% level. Veterans are signicantly more
likely to have higher socio-economic status, live in the south, have lower draft numbers, have a male
presence in youth, live in a metropolitan area, and earn higher wages. Turning to the rank attained.
In the US Military there are nine grades of enlisted ranks (E1 to E9), ve grades of warrant o¢ cers
(W1-W5) and eleven grades of o¢ cer ranks (O1 to O11). However the overwhelming majority
of the servicemen in this sample, due to a relatively short average spell of service, would only
have achieved the lower grades: enlisteds would rarely achieve a rank much higher than sergeant
(E5), and o¢ cers would rarely be promoted beyond captain (O3). There are virtually no warrant
o¢ cers. As a result, it is convenient to partition the rank distribution into four categories: private,
corporal, sergeant, and o¢ cer. Private refers to servicemen who attained the ranks of private,
private rst class, or lance corporal (corresponding to enlisted ranks E1 to E3). Corporalrefers
only to servicemen who attained that rank (E4). Sergeant refers to servicement attaining all
ranks of sergeant up to sergeant major or in the case of the Navy, petty o¢ cer (corresponding to
enlisted ranks E5 to E9).1 O¢ cer refers to all warrant o¢ cers and commissioned o¢ cers. In
actuality, o¢ cers largely consist of lieutenants and captains. To summarize, the data was recoded
as follows:
Recoded Rank Actual Rank
Private private, pvt 1st class, lance corporal (E1-E3)
Corporal Corporal (E4)
Sergeant Sergeant to Sergeant Major (E5-E9)
O¢ cer Warrant O¢ cer, Lieutenant to Major (W1-W5,O1-O5)
From table 1 we see that the among the veterans, 32% attained the rank of private, 38% corporal,
26% sergeant, and 5% o¢ cer. Observe also that wages increase steadily with rank. The increase is
1For a comparison of the ranks across the services army, navy, air force and marines, refer to
http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/rankchart/blenlistedrank.htm
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slight from non-veterans to privates, and then much more steeply as rank progresses.
5.2 Estimation Results
5.2.1 First Stage
We begin by estimating the rst stage bivariate probit-ordered probit pair of equations in (1)
by MLE. We selected a variety of covariates that reected initial conditions, household and
individual characteristics, and geographical characteristics. For initial conditions we use variables
at the beginning of the survey in 1966. These include geographical information such as measures of
local level unemployment, labor market condition, and labor force, metropolitan status, information
on region. These variables are meant to capture whether labor market conditions may a¤ect
individualswillingness to enlist. We also include family background characteristics such as whether
the parents were alive in the initial year, whether there was a paternal presence during adolescence,
and measures of family socio-economic status in the initial survey.2 For individual characteristics,
we focus on anthropometric measures such as height. We avoid using variables such as schooling
to minimize issues of endogeneity; the usage of parental socio-economic status proxies fairly well
for schooling. Cohort e¤ects were also included via the use of an orthogonal polynomial of birth
year (up to the fth degree). We experimented also with the use of cohort dummies but there
were little di¤erences in the results. Following Angrist (1990) we use the draft number of cohorts
facing the draft lottery. In view of this, we consider two samples. The rst sample consists only of
respondents born between 1944 and 1952  the cohorts that faced the draft lottery. The second,
larger sample in addition uses cohorts born before 1944. After eliminating missing observations
we are left with 2856 observations in the draft lottery sample, and 3554 observations in the full
sample.
2Socio Economic Index is a composite measure of parentsschooling, parentsoccupation, education of eldest sibling
and indicator of reading materials at home (eg, newspapers).
17
table 2 about here
In table 2 we present the results of estimating the rst stage equation that jointly determines
military entry and subsquent rank. The rst three columns refer to the military entry equation,
while the last three columns refer to the rank equation. From the estimates in the rst three
columns, we see that race, socio-economic status, the draft lottery number, and family background
characteristics are signicant predictors of military entry. Blacks are less likely to enter the
military. The presence of the father at age 14 has a positive e¤ect of military entry, but if the
parents are alive in 1966, the individual is much less likely to serve in the military. However in the
rank equation, only height and socio-economic status of parents are signicant predictors of rank.
Both are positive. The nding that height is signicant is in line with other research that nds
a wage premium to height (e.g. Sargent and Blanchower (1994) and Persico et al. 2004). Here,
height does not a¤ect military entry, but a¤ects rank, suggesting that tall individuals acquire more
leadership skills only after entry into the military. There is concavity in the e¤ect of socioeconomic
status of the family, which suggests that those with high and low levels of socioeconomic status are
less likely to serve. This e¤ect is reversed when we look at the rank equation, where rank increases
with family background. As is often the case with estimating bivariate probit models, we are
unable to estimate the correlation parameter 12 with much precision. Though not reported here,
we conducted a simulation study which conrmed that 12 is not well estimated whereas 1 and 2
are. Performing the same estimation on the larger full sample yields very similar results as shown
in table A1.
Our main interest in the rst stage is to obtain the two linear indices w01 and w02:We calcu-
late the parametric selection correction terms according to equations (3) to (11) : The rst equation
is the selection term corresponding to those who did not enter the military, and the latter eight
equations are parametric selection terms corresponding to the terms 01; 02; 11; 12; 21; 22; 31;
and 32. There are two expressions per rank, which correspond to the rst correction (military
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entry) and second correction (rank). For instance, (01; 02) correspond to the entry and rank
correction terms of privates, (11; 12) for corporals and so on. We calculate these expressions
using numerical integration routines such as those found in Press et al. (1992). To have an idea
of what the indices look like, refer to gure 1 which presents kernel density estimates of the two
indices for both the lottery and the full samples.
figure 1 here
5.2.2 Parametric Selection Wage Regressions
Table 3 (lottery sample) presents the second stage wage regressions, equation (12). We compare
several specications of the wage regression including and not including the selection correction
terms. We try these regressions using wages in two years. The sample consists of only those
individuals who reported positive earnings. The sample size is around 1900 to 2000 observations in
the draft lottery sample. We also consider the full sample which consists of around 2350 to 2450
observations in table A2.
table 3 about here
The rst column presents OLS regression of ln(wage in 1981) on a unity, polynomial in cohort,
a dummy for metropolitan standard area (MSA), years of schooling, dummies for black and rank
(the omitted category being non-veterans). As can be seen, the rank coe¢ cients for corporals
and sergeants are signicant. Column 2 presents the same specication including the parametric
selection correction terms c, 1 and 2: Immediately we see that the rank premium on corporals
and sergeants is no longer signicant. At the same time, none of the correction terms are signicant
as well. As years of schooling are likely to be endogenous, we also present instrumental variable
estimates of the same equation in column 3.3 Likewise, neither the rank terms nor the selection
3The instruments used are : central MSA, noncentral MSA, indicators of local unemployment rate and labor force
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correction terms are signicant. Columns 4 to 6 in table 3 present the same results with 1980
wages. We see that the results are similar, in that the coe¢ cients on the ranks of corporal and
sergeant are signicant under OLS, but when we add the selection correction terms and instrument
for years of schooling, we nd that neither the rank dummies nor the selection correction terms
are signicant. We also perform F-tests to check for joint signicance of the selection correction
terms and for the rank coe¢ cients. The tests fail to reject the null hypotheses in all but one case.
The results of the full sample turn out to be similar (see appendix). Although far from denitive,
we take this as supporting evidence that our parametric selection correction procedure does not
invalidate our use of OLS estimates of the rank premium.
To delve deeper into the lack of signicance when the selection correction terms are included,
we check for correlations among the regressors. We found that correlations between several of
the rank dummies and the selection correction terms were quite high: cor

cc;
P
j jj1

=
 0:77; cor

0;
P
j jj2

=  0:75, and cor

1;
P
j jj1

= 0:54: This suggests that near-
multicollinearity a¤ecting some key variables could be the main reason why neither the selection
correction terms nor the rank coe¢ cients are signicant. It also appears that the high correlations
are more severe around the lower levels of military participation (i.e. non-veterans, and privates).
Unfortunately there does not appear to be much we can do about it.
5.2.3 Matching Estimates
The preceding results indicate that the selection problem would not be severe and the OLS would
be valid. But OLS assumes the linear functional form and the OLS results may be biased if the
functional form is misspecied. To avoid this problem, we now try matching estimates of the rank
wage premium. Considering each rank separately, we have four treatments vs no treatment (non-
veteran). For each treated subject we nd a group of controls closest in terms of two indices that are
size in 1960, dummies for whether father and mother and respondent were born in the US, dummies for whether parents
were alive in 1966, and dummy for whether father was present in the household when the respondent was 14.
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the two linear indices in the rst stage MLE. The metric we use is the Malahanobis distance as per
equation (13). Table 4 presents the matching estimates of the TT e¤ect using M nearest-neighbor
estimation with M = 1; 5; 10: The TT e¤ect corresponds to equation (15) in the case of pairwise
matching, and equation (16) in the case of general M: Table 5 presents the estimates using caliper
matching with K = 0:007; 0:01; and 0:03: In each case bootstrap standard errors were calculated
using 2000 repetitions, except the case of M = 1 where the formula for asymptotic variance is
straightforward treating each pair as one unit. To assess the overall match, we also calculate the
average measure of covariate balance as per equation (17). As before, our calculations use 1980
wages and 1981 wages, and we also perform the analysis using the lottery sample and the larger
full sample.
We rst focus on table 4, nearest neighbor matching. Observe that as the number of neighbors
increase, across all ranks, the standard error of the estimated TT decreases. There is no discernible
pattern for the mean di¤erence. The net result is some gain in precision of the estimated rank
premium. It ranges between 8% and 14% for corporals, 9% and 12% for sergeants, and 15%
and 34% for o¢ cers. The most consistent results in terms of signicance levels are for corporals,
followed by o¢ cers (for the latter case we should note the smaller sample size). Indeed the standard
errors for corporals is the lowest across the four ranks. Turning next to average imbalance of the
indices, as expected, average imbalance increases as we increase the number of neighbors; but also
as would be expected, with larger numbers of neighbors in the control group, the rank premium
emerges as signicant. Fortunately this is achieved without signicant drop in covariate balance.
From this table, it begins to emerge that veteran status is not enough to command a wage premium
(observing the wage premium for privates would conrm this) but it is rank that carries with it a
premium.
table 4; 5; 6; 7 about here
Nearest neighbor matching may have the disadvantage that some treated subjects could be
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poorly matched due to lack of close enough controls. Indeed this might be true if covariate balance
were at worrying levels. To examine whether this might be a factor, we turn to consider caliper
matching, using a variety of di¤erent-sized calipers. Refer to table 5. As before, observe that
with an increase in the caliper size, more controls are included in the control group, and thus we
observe a fall in the standard errors of the estimated TT. There is no discernible pattern in the
mean di¤erence, and covariate balance levels are maintained at fairly low levels compared with the
M-NN. With a caliper size of 0.007, the percentage of unmatched treated subjects ranges from
11% to 29%. This decreases to 2.7% to 7.1% when caliper size is 0.03. Despite the smaller sample
size of o¢ cers, covariate balance does not change dramatically even at larger caliper sizes. The
levels of signicance are somewhat less than nearest neighbor estimates. However if one is willing
to admit signicance levels at the 10% level, then we still observe signicant wage premiums to
corporals, sergeants and o¢ cers at larger caliper sizes. As with the nearest neighbor estimates,
corporals appear to have the most consistent wage premiums.
We also perform the same analysis with a larger sample that includes the earlier cohorts (that
is, before the draft lottery was implemented). The rst stage results are found in appendix in table
A1. However we present the propensity score matching results here in tables 6 and 7. The addition
of the earlier cohorts increases the sample size by around 20%. The increased sample sizes result
in lower standard errors all round, and hence higher levels of signicance. As before, there is no
premium to being a private, but in this larger sample, we nd that the rank premium increases
with rank. For instance, looking at table 6, the 1981 wages of corporals were 10% to 13% higher
than comparable non-servicemen, but 14% to 17% higher for sergeants. In 1980 the wages were
8% to 10% for corporals, 13% to 17% for sergeants. We nd the same pattern holding when we
perform caliper matching in table 7. There is a premium to corporals of 9.5 to 14%, a premium
to sergeants of 16 to 18%, and a premium to o¢ cers of 18 to 33%.
For comparison, the bottom rows of tables 4 to 7 present the average of the index 1 and index
2 (before matching) in each group. However these rows also reveal some interesting ndings in
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themselves. Notice from table 4 that the average of index 2 for non-veterans is 0.381, which is in
between that of sergeants (0.289) and o¢ cers (0.672). We nd the same pattern in the other tables
as well. This implies that among the Vietnam era youth, there were many eligible among those
who did not serve in the military. In fact, they could have become sergeants or o¢ cers had they
done so!
The overall nding, therefore, is that among the Vietnam era youth cohorts, men born between
1940 and 1952 (full sample), there is a positive and signicant wage premium among veterans above
private, which increases monotonically in rank. When we restrict to the draft lottery cohorts (those
born 1944 and after), we nd slightly weaker results, but in those cases the rank premium is most
consistent among corporals, followed by o¢ cers. It is not signicant among sergeants.
Why Corporals? It seems surprising that in the lottery sample, there is stronger evidence of
a corporals wage premium over a sergeants wage premium. An understanding of NCO training
may provide a clue. Typically, NCOs are promoted from the lower ranks. The rank of Sergeant
could only be attained after 4 to 6 years of service. High casualty rates in the early years of the
Vietnam War led to attrition of the NCO ranks. In later years of the conict, the military sought
to replenish the depleted NCO ranks by establishing NCO training schools. Promising candidates
would be selected from among enlistees or draftees at an early stage (usually after basic training),
be trained for about 12 weeks, and instantly promoted to sergeants, bypassing the corporal rank.
The program was controversial, was widely thought to have produced shake and bakesergeants
or instant NCOswho were untested and lacked the experience and skill needed to lead men who
were their peers. By contrast, promotions to corporal could have come more slowly than promotions
to sergeant, and consequently may have been a clearer indicator of skill, leadership or ability.
Early Cohorts and Later Cohorts. We also observe that inclusion of the early cohorts
born before 1944 signicantly improved the matching results. On the one hand it could be due
to sample size. On the other hand, it is well documented that public opinion turned against
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the Vietnam war in the later years (1968 onwards). The later cohorts may have faced more of
the negative repercussions associated with an taking part in an increasingly unpopular war (for
instance, greater incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder and discrimination). The stronger
anti-war sentiment faced by the lottery cohorts (draftees in 1969 to 1972) may also explain why
the rank premium is weaker among the younger cohorts.
6 Conclusion
This paper set out to establish whether there is indeed a premium to leadership experience in
the military. We measure this premium using the highest attained rank in the military. To our
knowledge, our attempt at quantifying the impact of military leadership is a rst in the literature.
Our paper applies a parametric method to account for the possibility of non-random selection into
the military and selection into the nal rank attained. We then applied a nonparametric matching
method to avoid parametric regression functionmisspecication.
Our results from the parametric selection correction procedure indicate that after applying the
correction terms, the coe¢ cients on the rank dummy variables were no longer signicant. But then,
we failed to reject the null hypothesis that all correction terms are irrelevant. When we turn to the
nonparametric matching estimates, we found more convincing results. Limiting ourselves only to
lottery-era cohorts, we found the rank premium strongest among veterans who were corporals. The
rank premium for sergeant was less precisely estimated, and the premium of o¢ cers was signicant
and of large magnitude, although the sample size was small. We also found that extending our
sample to include pre-lottery cohorts improved the matching estimates signicantly. While it could
be due to sample size, it could also be that the results reect the negative repercussions associated
stronger anti-war sentiment faced by the later lottery cohorts of 1969 to 1972.
From our ndings, we argue that it is rank, not veteran status, that commands a wage premium
in the labor market. This is seen from the fact that the wage premium for privates is consistently
small and insignicant, but for corporals or above it is positive and signicant. We see two
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implications of this. Firstly, we interpret this as a return to leadership skills, and thus regard this
as contributing evidence to there being returns to non-cognitive skills. Secondly, it implies that the
veteranspremium (if there is one) is primarily one rewarding leadership, rather than participation
in the military. If one joins the military expecting a future wage premium but fails to get promoted
in rank, he would be disappointed.
This paper is related to a growing body of work focusing on non-schooling characteristics which
have an e¤ect on labor market success. This is a contribution to the existing literature documenting
the e¤ects of non-schooling, non-cognitive characteristics on labor market success. We stress in
particular the role played by leadership in the military, and not just veteran status. This emerging
body of evidence on the role of non-cognitive skills suggests there is much to uncover in the area
of pre-market human capital e¤ects.
7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of Likelihood
Observe that the second through the last terms of the log-likelihood function in equation (2) are the
likelihood contributions corresponding to being a private, corporal, sergeant and o¢ cer respectively:
P ( w01 < "1; "2 <  w02) = P ("2 <  w02)  P ("1 <  w01; "2 <  w02)
=  ( w02) 	( w01; w02; 12)  p0;
P ( w01 < "1; w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2)
= P ("2 <  w02 + 2)  P ("1 <  w01; "2 <  w02 + 2)  P ( w01 < "1; "2 <  w02)
=  ( w0+ 2) 	( w01; w02 + 2; 12)  p0  p1;
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P ( w01 < "1; w02 + 2 < "2 <  w02 + 3)
= P ("2 <  w02 + 3)  P ("1 <  w01; "2 <  w02 + 3)  P ( w01 < "1; "2 <  w02 + 2)
=  ( w02 + 3) 	( w01; w02 + 3; 12)  (p0 + p1) ;
P ( w01 < "1; w02 + 3 < "2)
= P ( w01 < "1)  P ("2 <  w02 + 3) + P ("1 <  w01; "2 <  w02 + 3)
=  (w01)   ( w02 + 3) + 	 ( w01; w02 + 3; 12) :
The above is made clear by referring to the following diagram, which pictures, for an individual
with characteristics w; the thresholds of "1 and "2 that determine his veteran status and rank.
figure A1 about here
The shaded area below the horizontal line  w1 consists of non-veterans. Entry requires that
"1   w1: Among entrants into the military, the thresholds,  w2;  w2 + 2; and  w2 + 3
denote the "2 thresholds separating private from corporal, corporal from sergeant, and sergeant
from o¢ cer respectively. For instance an individual i would be a private if  wi1 + "1i  0 and
 wi2 + "2i < 0; and so on.
7.2 Second Stage Correction Term
The selection correction terms are derived using the linear projection assumption of uj": To ease
exposition, we will deal with the fourth and rst terms, for which closed forms are obtainable. The
middle terms will then be examined, for which the correction terms are computed numerically.
Observe, for the fourth term.
E (ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 3) = 1E ("1jw;  w01 < "1;  w02 + 3 < "2)
+2E ("2jw;  w01 < "1;  w02 + 3 < "2) :
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Using the moment formulas for truncated bivariate normal distributions (e.g., Maddala (1983,
p.368)), the selection correction term is
1	
 1
12 f( w011) (t1) + 12 ( w02 + 3)  (t2)g
+2	
 1
12 f ( w02 + 3)  (t2) + 12 ( w01)  (t1)g ;
where, because the distribution of ("1; "2) is the same as that of ("1; "2) except that 12 is replaced
by  12,
	12  P ( w01 < "1;  w02 + 3 < "2) = P ( "1 < w01;  "2 < w02   3)
= 	(w01; w02   3; 12);
t1   w
02 + 3 + 12w
01p
1  212
; t2   w
01 + 12(w
02   3)p
1  212
:
Analogously, for the rst term, we get
E (ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 0)
= 1E ("1jw;  w01 < "1; "2 <  w02) + 2E ("2jw;  w01 < "1; "2 <  w02)
= 1E ("1jw;  w01 < "1; w02 <  "2) + 2E ("2jw;  w01 < "1; w02 <  "2) :
The selection correction term is
1	
 1
12 f( w011)(t1)  12(w02)(t2)g+ 2	 112 f(w02)(t2)  12( w01)(t1)g
where
	12  P ( w01 < "1; w02 <  "2) = P ( "1 < w01; "2 <  w02)
= 	 (w01; w02; 12) ;
t1  w
02   12w01p
1  212
; t2   w
01 + 12w
02p
1  212
:
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Turning to the second term, observe
E (ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 1)
= 1E ("1jw;  w01 < "1;  w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2)
+ 2E ("2jw;  w01 < "1;  w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2) :
Di¤erently from the previous two terms, the closed form for this seems di¢ cult to get. Instead, we
get the selection correction terms numerically. Observe
E ("1jw; w01 < "1; w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2) =
R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01 "1 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2
;
E ("2jw; w01 < "1; w02 < "2 <  w02 + 2) =
R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01 "2 ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2R  w02+2
 w02
R1
 w01  ("1; "2; 12)d"1d"2
;
which are equations (6) and (7) respectively. For the given estimate for (01; 
0
2; 12; 2; 3) from
the rst stage, these integrals can be obtained numerically for each observation in the second stage
using a variety of quadrature routines.
As for the third term, observe
E (ujw; d1 = 1; d2 = 2) = 1E ("1jw;  w01 < "1;  w02 + 2 < "2 <  w02 + 3)
+ 2E ("2jw;  w01 < "1;  w02 + 2 < "2 <  w02 + 3) :
The integrals (8) and (9) then follow. For consistency we use numerical evaluations for all the
integrals. Thus we derive the numerical integrals for the rst and fourth terms in equations (4) ;
(5) ; (10) and (11) in the same way.
References
Abowd, J. M., F. Kramarz, and D. N. Margolis (1999): High Wage Workers and High
Wage Firms,Econometrica, 67(2), 251333.
Anderson, D. J. (2000): If You Let me Play: The E¤ects of Participation in High School
Athletics on StudentsBehavior and Economic Success,Mimeo, Cornell University.
28
Angrist, J. D. (1989): Using the Draft Lottery to Measure the E¤ect of Military Service on Civil-
ian Labor Market Outcomesvol. 10 of Research in Labor Economics. JAI Press, Inc., Greenwich.
(1990): Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from Social
Security Administrative Records,American Economic Review, 80(3), 31336.
(1998): Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service Using Social
Security Data on Military Applicants,Econometrica, 66(2), 249288.
Angrist, J. D., and A. Krueger (1994): Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More Than
Nonveterans?,Journal of Labor Economics, 12(1), 7497.
Arvey, R., M. Rotundo, and W. Johnson (2002): The Determinants of Leadership: The
Role of Genetic, Personality and Cognitive Factors, Mimeo, Carlson School of Management,
Minneapolis.
Arvey, R., M. Rotundo, W. Johnson, and M. McGue (2004): The Determinants of Leader-
ship: The Role of Genetic, Personality and Cognitive Factors,Mimeo, University of Minnesota.
Barron, J. M., B. Ewing, and G. Waddell (2000): The E¤ects of High School Athletic
Participation on Education and Labor Market Outcomes,Review of Economics and Statistics,
82(3), 113.
Baskir, L. A., and W. A. Strauss (1978): Chance and Circumstance: the Draft, the War, and
the Vietnam Generation. Alfred A. Knopf, New York.
Berger, M. C., and B. T. Hirsch (1983): The Civilian Earnings Experience of Vietnam-Era
Veterans,Journal of Human Resources, XVIII(4), 455479.
Bowles, S., H. Gintis, and M. Osborne (2001): The Determinants of Earnings: Skills,
Preferences and Schooling,Journal of Economic Literature, 39(4), 11371176.
Cawley, J., J. J. Heckman, and E. Vytlacil (2001): Three Observations on Wages and
Measured Cognitive Ability,Labour Economics, 8, 419442.
29
DeTray, D. (1982): Veteran Status as a Screening Device, American Economic Review, 72,
13342.
Dubin, J. A., and D. Rivers (1989): Selection bias in linear regression,Sociological Methods
and Research, 18, 360390.
Eccles, J., and B. Barber (1999): Student Council, Volunteering, Basketball, or Marching
Band: What Kind of Extracurricular Involvement Matters?, Journal of Adolescent Research,
14(1), 1043.
Eide, E., and N. Ronan (2000): Is Participation in High School Athletics an Investment or
Consumption Good? Evidence from High School and Beyond,Mimeo, Brigham Young Univer-
sity.
Foley, M. S. (2003): Confronting the War Machine: Draft Resistance During the Vietnam War.
The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London.
Goldberg, M. S., and J. T. Warner (1986): Military Experience, Civilian Experience, and
the Earnings of Veterans,Journal of Human Resources, XXII(1), 6281.
Green, F., S. Machin, and D. Wilkenson (1998): The Meaning and Determinants of Skills
Shortages,Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 60(2), 165188.
Hamermesh, D., and J. Biddle (1994): Beauty and the Labor Market,American Economic
Review, 84(5), 117494.
Heckman, J. J. (2000): Policies to Foster Human Capital,Research in Economics, 54, 356.
Heckman, J. J., and P. Carneiro (2004): Human Capital Policy,chap. 2, pp. 77239, Inequality
in America: What Role for Human Capital Policies? MIT Press.
Hirsch, B. T., and S. L. Mehay (2003): Evaluating the Labor Market Performance of Veterans
Using a Matched Comparison Group Design,Journal of Human Resources, 38(3), 673700.
Kuhn, P., and C. Weinberger (2005): Leadership Skills and Wages,Forthcoming, Journal
of Labor Economics.
30
Lee, M.-J. (2005): Micro-econometrics for Policy, Program and Treatment E¤ects. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Maddala, G. S. (1983): Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics. Cambridge
University Press.
Mueller, U., and A. Mazur (1996): Facial Dominance of West Point Cadets as a Predictor of
Later Military Rank,Social Forces, 74(3), 823850.
Persico, N., A. Postlewaite, and D. Silverman (2004): The E¤ect of Adolescent Experience
on Labor Market Outcomes: The Case of Height,Journal of Political Economy, 112(5), 101953.
Postlewaite, A., and D. Silverman (2005): Social Isolation and Inequality,Mimeo, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.
Press, W., S. A. Teukolsky, W. T. Vetterling, and B. P. Flannery (1992): Numerical
Recipes in Fortran, vol. 1. Cambridge University Press, 2 edn.
Rosenbaum, P., and D. Rubin (1983): The central role of the propensity score in observational
studies for causal e¤ects,Biometrika, 70, 4155.
Sargent, J. D., and D. G. Blanchflower (1994): Obesity and Stature in Adolescence and
Earnings in Young Adulthood: Analysis of a British Birth Cohort, Archives Pediatric and
Adolescent Medicine, 148, 68187.
Tarr, C. W. (1981): By the Numbers: the Reform of the Selective Service System 1970-1972.
National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC.
Van de Ven, W., and B. V. Praag (1981): The demand for deductibles in private health
insurance,Journal of Econometrics, 17, 229252.
Wong, L., P. Bliese, and D. McGurk (2003): Military Leadership: A Context Specic
Review,The Leadership Quarterly, 14, 657692.
31
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Central 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47
Noncentral 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48
Black 0.24 0.43 0.16 0.37 *
Height 70.62 3.34 70.67 3.31
Socio Economic Index 1966 10.03 2.39 10.29 1.96 *
South Residence 1966 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.48 *
Male Labor Market Index 1966 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.50
Draft Number *100 1.55 1.19 1.37 1.16 *
Unemployment Rate 1960 5.23 1.68 5.17 1.71
Labor Force Size 1960 0.57 1.06 0.55 1.02
Father Present at Age 14 0.63 0.48 0.67 0.47 *
Respondent Born US 0.73 0.44 0.75 0.43
Father Alive 1966 0.92 0.28 0.91 0.28
Mother Alive 1966 0.97 0.16 0.97 0.18
Log wage 1980 9.74 0.75 9.88 0.64 *
Log Wage 1981 9.70 0.84 9.88 0.69 *
Years of Schooling 13.17 3.00 13.32 2.09
SMSA Residence in 1981 0.67 0.47 0.73 0.44 *
Private 0.32 0.46
Corporal 0.38 0.49
Sergeant 0.26 0.44
Officer 0.05 0.22
Number of obs 2605 1171
Panel B: Wages by Rank Mean SD Mean SD
Nonveteran 9.74 0.75 9.70 0.84
Private 9.77 0.80 9.74 0.80
Corporal 9.86 0.50 9.88 0.59
Sergeant 9.97 0.59 9.97 0.67
Officer 10.25 0.59 10.26 0.62
* Significantly different at 5% level.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Non-Veterans Veterans
1980 1981
Coeff Std err T-ratio Coeff Std err T-ratio
Constant 1.231 0.755 1.63 -1.166 1.229 -0.95
Central MSA 0.107 0.073 1.47 0.090 0.273 0.33
Noncentral MSA 0.084 0.071 1.18 -0.039 0.225 -0.17
Black -0.205 0.074 -2.75 -0.021 0.508 -0.04
Height 0.001 0.007 0.08 0.024 0.013 1.84
South Resident in 1966 -0.044 0.062 -0.72 0.197 0.132 1.50
Male Labor Market index in 1966 -0.048 0.064 -0.76 -0.125 0.145 -0.86
Draft Sequence Number * 100 -0.086 0.024 -3.58 -0.025 0.207 -0.12
Unemployment Rate 1960 -0.025 0.015 -1.67 -0.023 0.062 -0.38
Size Of Labor Force 1960 -0.035 0.029 -1.21 -0.037 0.093 -0.40
Father In The Household At Age 14 0.333 0.068 4.88 0.251 0.794 0.32
Respondent Born In The Us 0.196 0.064 3.06 -0.080 0.467 -0.17
Father Alive In 1966 -0.364 0.104 -3.50 -0.134 0.862 -0.16
Mother Alive In 1966 -0.399 0.162 -2.47 0.018 0.932 0.02
Socio-Economic Index 0.024 0.032 0.75 0.193 0.084 2.29
Socio-Economic Index Squared -0.176 0.030 -5.85 0.063 0.425 0.15
gamma2 1.074 0.052 20.53
gamma3 2.340 0.104 22.44
rho12 -0.006 3.352 0.00
Cohort Polynomial Included? yes
Log Likelihood -2801.1
Number of Observations 2867
Military Entry Equation Rank Equation
Table 2: First Stage Selection Model
IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lw81 lw81 lw81 lw80 lw80 lw80
years of schooling 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.084** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.082**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.036) (0.006) (0.006) (0.032)
In MSA 1981 0.247*** 0.250*** 0.236*** 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.226***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.049) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043)
Black -0.302*** -0.306*** -0.276*** -0.293*** -0.287*** -0.243***
(0.043) (0.046) (0.072) (0.040) (0.043) (0.066)
Private 0.008 -0.309 -0.257 -0.014 -0.252 -0.116
(0.061) (0.284) (0.327) (0.055) (0.252) (0.300)
Corporal 0.179*** -0.029 -0.016 0.143*** 0.031 0.114
(0.053) (0.228) (0.246) (0.048) (0.203) (0.227)
Sergeant 0.123** -0.011 -0.037 0.109** 0.082 0.108
(0.061) (0.204) (0.207) (0.055) (0.182) (0.188)
Officer 0.136 0.151 0.031 0.139 0.292 0.185
(0.148) (0.247) (0.290) (0.129) (0.220) (0.249)
lambdac -0.019 -0.069 0.058 0.046
(0.156) (0.163) (0.143) (0.145)
lambda1 0.111 0.107 0.047 0.014
(0.152) (0.159) (0.135) (0.143)
lambda2 -0.158 -0.105 -0.188* -0.114
(0.119) (0.152) (0.106) (0.134)
Observations 2010 2010 2001 1914 1914 1908
Adjusted R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.136 0.147 0.147 0.139
P value of F-test ranks=0 0.14 0.24 0.05 0.14
P-value of F-test lambdas=0 0.59 0.82 0.34 0.83
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All equations include cohort polynomials.
Table 3: Second Stage of Parametric Selection Model
OLS OLS
Non-vet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer Non-vet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer
# Treated 1369 179 252 182 28 1375 183 257 187 31
Panel A: Pairwise
Mean ln(wage) difference 0.012 0.082 0.098 0.151 -0.013 0.118 0.054 0.182
Std Err (0.088) (0.061) (0.082) (0.148) (0.079) (0.061) (0.069) (0.143)
T-ratio 0.14 1.35 1.21 1.03 -0.16 1.93 0.79 1.27
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0012 0.0003 0.0043 0.0022 -0.0002 0.0019 0.0062 -0.0031
Index 2 -0.0011 -0.0012 0.0044 0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0012 0.0060 -0.0040
Panel B: M=5
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.021 0.143 0.090 0.341 -0.022 0.096 0.081 0.347
Std Err (0.076) (0.060) (0.071) (0.164) (0.076) (0.052) (0.062) (0.143)
T-ratio -0.27 2.38 1.26 2.07 -0.29 1.85 1.30 2.43
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0025 0.0052 0.0113 0.0020 0.0030 0.0052 0.0112 0.0014
Index 2 -0.0019 0.0025 0.0073 0.0138 -0.0021 0.0026 0.0084 0.0131
Panel C: M=10
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.010 0.127 0.120 0.329 -0.021 0.086 0.121 0.347
Std Err (0.071) (0.052) (0.065) (0.151) (0.070) (0.044) (0.056) (0.132)
T-ratio -0.14 2.43 1.84 2.17 -0.30 1.96 2.17 2.63
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0057 0.0081 0.0136 0.0186 0.0057 0.0076 0.0139 0.0104
Index 2 -0.0009 0.0040 0.0072 0.0245 -0.0018 0.0036 0.0079 0.0200
Balance Before Matching
Index 1 -0.655 0.170 0.263 0.361 0.343 -0.647 0.154 0.241 0.345 0.305
Index 2 0.381 0.052 0.154 0.289 0.672 0.384 0.037 0.136 0.281 0.646
NB: Balance before matching: the number in the "nonvet" column refers to the average of the index among non-veterans.
The next four columns after that refer to difference of the average from non-veterans.  For instance, -0.655 is the average value of
index 1 among nonvets. For privates, the average value of index 1 is 0.17 higher, and so on.
Table 4: Pairwise and M-NN Matching, Lottery Sample
1981 1980
Non-vet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer Non-vet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer
# Treated 1369 179 252 182 28 1375 183 257 187 31
Panel A: Caliper = 0.007
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.054 0.130 0.062 0.147 -0.083 0.086 0.086 0.183
Std Err (0.094) (0.071) (0.091) (0.188) (0.089) (0.066) (0.075) (0.204)
T-ratio -0.58 1.84 0.68 0.78 -0.93 1.30 1.15 0.90
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 -0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0021 -0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0030
Index 2 -0.0024 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0033 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0006
Nonmatched 0.129 0.111 0.176 0.286 0.148 0.128 0.150 0.290
Panel B: Caliper = 0.01
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.055 0.145 0.082 0.243 -0.052 0.110 0.102 0.247
Std Err (0.089) (0.063) (0.080) (0.225) (0.089) (0.059) (0.071) (0.211)
T-ratio -0.61 2.30 1.02 1.08 -0.58 1.85 1.43 1.17
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 -0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 0.0027 -0.0022 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0009
Index 2 -0.0019 -0.0010 0.0008 0.0054 -0.0017 -0.0010 0.0009 0.0035
Nonmatched 0.084 0.071 0.126 0.179 0.087 0.090 0.107 0.226
Panel C: Caliper = 0.03
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.009 0.137 0.115 0.206 -0.021 0.074 0.143 0.323
Std Err (0.077) (0.054) (0.066) (0.157) (0.076) (0.044) (0.056) (0.156)
T-ratio -0.12 2.57 1.74 1.31 -0.28 1.67 2.56 2.08
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0014 0.0017 0.0030 0.0024 0.0002 0.0010 0.0039 -0.0010
Index 2 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0018 0.0049 -0.0014 -0.0011 0.0030 0.0037
Nonmatched 0.039 0.028 0.033 0.071 0.038 0.027 0.027 0.065
Balance Before Matching
Index 1 -0.655 0.170 0.263 0.361 0.343 -0.647 0.154 0.241 0.345 0.305
Index 2 0.381 0.052 0.154 0.289 0.672 0.384 0.037 0.136 0.281 0.646
NB: Balance before matching: the number in the "nonvet" column refers to the average of the index among non-veterans.
The next four columns after that refer to difference of the average from non-veterans.  For instance, -0.655 is the average value of
index 1 among nonvets. For privates, the average value of index 1 is 0.17 higher, and so on.
Table 5: Caliper Matching - Lottery Sample
1981 1980
Non vet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer Non vet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer
# Treated 1665 234 302 222 32 1680 240 309 224 34
Panel A: Pairwise
Mean ln(wage) difference 0.001 0.104 0.161 0.297 -0.020 0.102 0.172 0.389
Std Err (0.073) (0.051) (0.067) (0.180) (0.070) (0.052) (0.071) (0.182)
T-ratio 0.01 2.02 2.41 1.65 -0.28 1.95 2.43 2.14
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0010 0.0012 0.0037 0.0064 0.0007 0.0021 0.0040 0.0047
Index 2 -0.0008 0.0015 0.0024 0.0107 -0.0002 0.0033 0.0021 0.0084
Panel B: M=5
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.0166 0.1297 0.1404 0.2796 -0.018 0.100 0.132 0.307
Std Err (0.067) (0.051) (0.063) (0.156) (0.064) (0.046) (0.059) (0.136)
T-ratio -0.25 2.54 2.23 1.79 -0.28 2.18 2.23 2.25
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0026 0.0022 0.0055 0.0034 0.0022 0.0029 0.0044 0.0087
Index 2 -0.0006 0.0017 0.0037 0.0117 0.0002 0.0028 0.0019 0.0126
Panel C: M=10
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.019 0.099 0.174 0.368 -0.028 0.077 0.146 0.311
Std Err (0.061) (0.045) (0.056) (0.151) (0.057) (0.040) (0.053) (0.123)
T-ratio -0.31 2.20 3.12 2.44 -0.49 1.95 2.74 2.53
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Index 2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
Balance Before Matching
Index 1 -0.619 0.174 0.226 0.312 0.361 -0.610 0.163 0.209 0.296 0.330
Index 2 0.369 0.038 0.116 0.244 0.594 0.372 0.026 0.093 0.243 0.590
NB: Balance before matching: the number in the "nonvet" column refers to the average of the index among non-veterans.
The next four columns after that refer to difference of the average from non-veterans.  For instance, -0.619 is the average value of
index 1 among nonvets. For privates, the average value of index 1 is 0.174 higher, and so on.
Table 6: Pairwise and M-NN Matching, Full Sample
1981 1980
Nonvet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer Nonvet Private Corporal Sergeant Officer
# Treated 1665 234 302 222 32 1680 240 309 224 34
Panel A: Caliper = 0.007
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.015 0.095 0.167 0.187 -0.0282 0.1169 0.1955 0.2279
Std Err (0.079) (0.055) (0.069) (0.167) (0.071) (0.060) (0.076) (0.170)
T-ratio -0.19 1.72 2.40 1.12 -0.40 1.96 2.57 1.34
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0012 0.0020 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0015 0.0026
Index 2 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0001 0.0042 0.0006 0.0006 0.0001 0.0044
Nonmatched 0.120 0.099 0.077 0.125 0.146 0.123 0.085 0.177
Panel B: Caliper = 0.01
Mean ln(wage) difference 0.001 0.139 0.167 0.232 -0.040 0.096 0.187 0.274
Std Err (0.072) (0.054) (0.066) (0.165) (0.070) (0.052) (0.075) (0.169)
T-ratio 0.02 2.57 2.53 1.41 -0.57 1.85 2.51 1.62
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 -0.0001 0.0017 0.0015 0.0008 0.0000 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011
Index 2 -0.0005 0.0012 0.0012 0.0037 0.0000 0.0017 0.0007 0.0037
Nonmatched 0.077 0.060 0.050 0.125 0.096 0.078 0.054 0.177
Panel C: Caliper = 0.03
Mean ln(wage) difference -0.001 0.128 0.185 0.326 -0.020 0.088 0.159 0.329
Std Err (0.062) (0.044) (0.060) (0.163) (0.060) (0.039) (0.051) (0.144)
T-ratio -0.02 2.87 3.11 2.00 -0.34 2.24 3.08 2.28
Cov. Balance:
Index 1 0.0016 0.0024 0.0024 0.0024 0.0017 0.0022 0.0027 0.0033
Index 2 0.0007 0.0021 0.0029 0.0029 0.0007 0.0024 0.0026 0.0049
Nonmatched 0.043 0.013 0.014 0.031 0.029 0.013 0.013 0.088
Balance Before Matching
Index 1 -0.619 0.174 0.226 0.312 0.361 -0.610 0.163 0.209 0.296 0.330
Index 2 0.369 0.038 0.116 0.244 0.594 0.372 0.026 0.093 0.243 0.590
NB: Balance before matching: the number in the "nonvet" column refers to the average of the index among non-veterans.
The next four columns after that refer to difference of the average from non-veterans.  For instance, -0.619 is the average value of
index 1 among nonvets. For privates, the average value of index 1 is 0.174 higher, and so on.
Table 7: Caliper Matching - Full Sample
19801981
Coeff Std err T-ratio Coeff Std err T-ratio
Constant -0.206 0.511 -0.40 -1.509 3.346 -0.45
Central MSA 0.174 0.065 2.67 0.014 0.422 0.03
Noncentral MSA 0.145 0.063 2.29 -0.106 0.362 -0.29
Black -0.237 0.066 -3.56 -0.034 0.588 -0.06
Height -0.003 0.006 -0.42 0.026 0.013 1.96
South Resident in 1966 -0.035 0.055 -0.64 0.178 0.113 1.57
Male Labor Market index in 1966 -0.043 0.057 -0.76 -0.135 0.129 -1.05
Draft Sequence Number * 100 -0.088 0.024 -3.67 -0.029 0.213 -0.14
unemployment rate 1960 -0.009 0.013 -0.65 -0.012 0.028 -0.41
size of labor force 1960 -0.029 0.025 -1.16 -0.025 0.080 -0.31
Father in the household at age 14 0.296 0.058 5.10 0.180 0.714 0.25
Respondent born in the US 0.201 0.056 3.57 -0.079 0.489 -0.16
Father alive in 1966 -0.233 0.086 -2.72 -0.070 0.566 -0.12
Mother alive in 1966 -0.313 0.138 -2.27 -0.066 0.757 -0.09
socio-economic index 0.045 0.028 1.58 0.214 0.129 1.66
socio-economic index squared -0.179 0.026 -6.82 0.070 0.444 0.16
lottery sample 0.238 0.193 1.23 0.335 0.622 0.54
gamma2 1.046 0.043 24.05
gamma3 2.293 0.085 27.06
rho12 -0.001 3.406 0.00
cohort polynomial included? yes
log likelihood -3538.9
Number of observations 3554
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Table A1: First Stage Selection Model - Full Sample
IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lw81 lw81 lw81 lw80 lw80 lw80
years of schooling 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.097***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.029) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026)
cohort1 -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.144*** -0.125*** -0.126*** -0.136***
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018)
cohort2 -0.015 -0.014 -0.018 -0.02 -0.018 -0.02
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017)
cohort3 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.015 0.012 0.01
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)
In MSA 1981 0.250*** 0.254*** 0.234*** 0.263*** 0.269*** 0.230***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.043) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039)
black -0.324*** -0.330*** -0.297*** -0.325*** -0.330*** -0.266***
(0.037) (0.041) (0.059) (0.035) (0.038) (0.056)
private -0.008 -0.273 -0.219 -0.007 -0.269 -0.116
(0.051) (0.237) (0.255) (0.047) (0.214) (0.237)
corporal 0.156*** -0.015 -0.017 0.116*** -0.026 0.035
(0.046) (0.192) (0.195) (0.042) (0.174) (0.181)
sergeant 0.127** 0.007 -0.036 0.108** 0.024 0.011
(0.053) (0.180) (0.183) (0.048) (0.164) (0.166)
officer 0.15 0.124 -0.021 0.126 0.159 -0.029
(0.131) (0.221) (0.269) (0.118) (0.201) (0.234)
lambda_c -0.028 -0.091 -0.04 -0.099
(0.141) (0.155) (0.130) (0.137)
lambda_1 0.112 0.107 0.073 0.036
(0.134) (0.136) (0.121) (0.125)
lambda_2 -0.112 -0.051 -0.144 -0.038
(0.097) (0.122) (0.088) (0.110)
Observations 2455 2455 2444 2349 2349 2341
Adjusted R-squared 0.175 0.175 0.169 0.18 0.18 0.161
P value of F-test ranks=0 0.15 0.32 0.14 0.41
P value of F-test lambdas=0 0.66 0.8 0.39 0.83
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All equations include cohort polynomials.
Table A2: Second Stage of Parametric Selection Model - Full Sample
OLS OLS
Figure 1: Indices From first Stage
Index 1: Military Entry
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Index 2: Rank
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
-2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Lottery Sample
Full Sample
Figure A1: Rank by Region in (ε1,ε2) Space.
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